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Abstract—The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid
has proven its devastation by hacking into their critical cyber
assets. With administrative privileges accessing substation net-
works/local control centers, one intelligent way of coordinated
cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching exe-
cutions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can
cause significant impacts to an interconnected power grid. Unlike
the previous power blackouts, such high-impact initiating events
can aggravate operating conditions, initiating instability that may
lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic evaluation of
“nightmare” scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to
manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protect-
ing their cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual
expansion of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact
analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework that emphasizes on
the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic aspects of
power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the combina-
torial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages
and dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the
permutation. The expanded framework includes (1) critical/non-
critical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation, and
(3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends with a discussion
of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining the
impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies.
Index Terms—Consequential cyberattacks, cyber-physical se-
curity, power substations, system resilience, the I of RAIM.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF POWER GRID CYBERSECURITY
THE smart grid roadmap has been envisioned to promotedeploying advanced communication infrastructure as well
as integrating distributed energy resources with existing power
infrastructure. The digital upgrade of grid systems provides
tremendous opportunities to integrate advanced sensing tech-
nologies, such as synchrophasor units across substations, for
monitoring and control of a power grid. The new definition
of grid reliability in this vision focuses on increased ability to
withstand severe weather events, deliberate sabotage, and cy-
berattacks. Intelligent automation and communications infras-
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tructure is intended to improve the accuracy of detection of ab-
normal conditions with “self-healing” capability. Such features
have been implemented in power control center applications
that facilitate monitoring and control. Technological evolution
of computerized management system on supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) infrastructure can potentially
be prone to electronic intrusions due to the vulnerabilities of
access points in critical infrastructure [1]–[3].
A. Digital Modernization and Emerging Threats
There have been growing concerns over the potential of
cyberattacks on the integration of IP-based communication
infrastructure. Misconceptions of power grid cybersecurity
have been reported [7]. One real example of persistent threat
is Stuxnet. Comparable attack agents launched by a group
of attackers or organizations able to systematically penetrate
the generation control networks that would enable coordi-
nated cyberattack in power grid SCADA networks have been
hypothesized [8], [9]. The sophistication of such persistent
attacks will continue to evolve with domain-specific targets
[9]. Another example is the 2011 Night Dragon attack [10].
Clearly, coordinated attacks pose a great threat to the SCADA
network of a nations power grid. A published workshop by the
National Academies [11] has indicated the trend of cyberat-
tacks will further evolve towards more adaptive, coordinated,
and persistent attack capabilities. Attackers can gain access to
substation communication frameworks through access points
such as gateways, leased-line and dial-up modems, virtual
private networks (VPN), wireless links [4] as well as by
physically breaking into unstaffed substations. Once attackers
gain access to intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) they can
access substation configuration descriptions and configurations
in IED description files. By modifying the critical settings of
specific IEDs and protective relays, intruder can disrupt the
smooth operation of substation, in the worst case causing dev-
astating failures of substation equipment and even cascading
shutdown of other substations.
As depicted generally in Fig. 1, the following combinations
enumerate possible remote connections to local substation-
level networks, describing intrusion paths from outside to the
control networks.
● Any (A1,A2,A3)–B1–B2–C1
● Any (A1,A2,A3)–B1–B2–C2
● Any (A1,A2,A3)–B3–C3
Each combination includes connections through remote
dial-up systems or VPN to substation-level networks targeted
on substation user interface or IEDs. Once a local network
2Fig. 1: SCADA Infrastructure and Network Connectivity Between Substation-Level Network, Control Centers, and a Wind Farm Management
System [4]–[6].
has been compromised, a cyberattack can be launched either
through (1) User interface, C1, (2) Direct IED connection,
C2, or (3) Eavesdropping and data packet modification, C3.
Once the network security has been compromised, there are
two possibilities that allow the attackers to launch a cyber
attack, i.e., (A) through user interface on the local network,
or (B) direct access to IEDs (Both numbered as C1 and C2 in
Fig. 1, respectively). Generally, the intrusion scenarios enable
attackers to launch disruptive switching actions through (A)
direct accessing substation IEDs [12], [13] or (B) accessing
substation user interfaces in the local network. Due to the
increasing penetration of renewable energy sources around the
world, the curtailment of wind generation is required in some
countries. This includes active power control and reactive
power control within the plant-level control. The undesired
tripping of the wind farm and deficiency of the secondary
reserve as well as the supported reactive power could dete-
riorate voltage and frequency. An intelligent cyberattack to
this control system, upon successful intrusion to the network,
would be a new threat to overcome [5], [6].
B. Technical Compliance of Federal Agencies
The expanding IP-based communication infrastructure in
power substations raises the likelihood of coordinated cyberat-
tacks which threaten power grids with a large-scale blackout.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commissions (FERC) studies on
United States power grids reveal that small-scale coordinated
cyberattacks on multiple substations could cause a nationwide
blackout [14]. Over the past seven years, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has mandated compliance
with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) standards in ten manda-
tory areas including sabotage reporting and the implementation
of physical and electronic security of cyber assets within
electronic security perimeters. Although various versions of
CIP standards have been amended to strengthen security
protections, compliant sites are still at risk of malware-based
attacks such as Stuxnet, able to propagate within substation-
level wide-area Intranet networks. The consequences of po-
tential cyberattacks can severely affect the reliability. A cyber-
vulnerability assessment framework with improved component
outage simulation could establish valuable new sets of opera-
tional and financial constraints for overall system planning.
Hypothetical attack scenarios disrupting the flow of power
within a transmission system may have detrimental effects that
can lead to system instability.
C. Stakeholders’ Investment Decisions
Existing, ongoing improvements to systems management
for IP-based solutions help to protect critical cyber assets
against electronic manipulations. Although promoting cyber-
situational awareness helps grid operators to deal with extreme
circumstances, preliminary pre-attack steps can add significant
cyber-protection value as well. Cybersecurity of computerized
automation systems for SCADA networks governing the phys-
ical part of the grid can be a point of vulnerability if the critical
cyber assets are not regularly audited for potential “high-
impact, low-probability” attack events. Such audits should
affect the prioritization of cyber asset investment. A tool
for systemic security management with metrics quantifying
detrimental effects of hypothesized attack scenarios has not yet
become a standard procedure as part of the strategic investment
planning for cyberinfrastructure.
All substation-level and substation-connected networks are
Wi-Fi or Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
(WiMAX)-disabled. In some extreme cases, the computers
of the control system can be air-gapped by segregating from
unsecured networks, with solely local cyber-physical system
that has no communication at all to the rest of the world.
This includes radio silence in which all employees are not
allowed to bring their cellphone to the sites when they are
in duty. The critical infrastructure network has the stringent
3Primary 
Trasnmission 
Control Center 
Backup 
Transmission 
Control Center
Substation 1 
(large load)
Substation 2
(large load)
Substation S 
(large load)
Generator 1 Generator 2 Generator G...
Distribution 
Control Center 1
Distribution 
Control Center 2
Distribution 
Control Center D
...
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 1
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 2
Distribution 
Substations in 
region DS
Power Transmission Network (Control Area 1)
Power Distribution Network (Control Region 1)
Primary 
Trasnmission 
Control Center 
Backup 
Transmission 
Control Center
Substation 1 
(large load)
Substation 2
(large load)
Substation S 
(large load)
Generator 1 Generator 2 Generator G...
Distribution 
Control Center 1
Distribution 
Control Center 2
Distribution 
Control Center D
...
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 1
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 2
Distribution 
Substations in 
region DS
Power Transmission Network (Control Area 2)
Power Distribution Network (Control Region 2)
Primary 
Trasnmission 
Control Center 
Backup 
Transmission 
Control Center
Substation 1 
(large load)
Substation 2
(large load)
Substation S 
(large load)
Generator 1 Generator 2 Generator G...
Distribution 
Control Center 1
Distribution 
Control Center 2
Distribution 
Control Center D
...
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 1
...
Distribution 
Substations in 
region 2
Distribution 
Substations in 
region DS
Power Transmission Network (Control Area C)
Power Distribution Network (Control Region R)
...
Physically interconnected Bi-directional flow of information Bi-directional flow of information (Passive and only if the primarycontrol center fails this over to the backup center
Primary Interconnection Control Center Backup Interconnection Control Center
 
Fig. 2: Generalized Wide-Area SCADA Network Connectivity Between Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Systems of a Power
Interconnection.
rules against intrusion-based attacks in the sense of disallowing
untrusted devices to the sites for the prevention of unnecessary
pivoting to the control network. There may be other networks
that are accessible by VPN or dial-in connections, which pose
the real threats of external attackers. We also assume that the
insiders would be a possible event that may assist the outsiders
for plotting a cyberattack. Continued deployment of new
communication infrastructure is changing risk management
practices, both in terms of operation and planning.
The United States Department of Energy (DOE) intro-
duced an electricity subsector cybersecurity capability maturity
model (ES-C2M2) tool as part of a Smart Grid Investment
Grant (SGIG) project enhancement. This tool provides electric
utilities and grid operators the ability to assess their cyberse-
curity capabilities, in order to prioritize investments in im-
proving such capabilities. The progress of SGIG-implemented
projects with cybersecurity plans (CSP) has been a catalyst
for promoting awareness and specific control-framework risk-
focused preparations with potential mitigation strategies. The
United States National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) special publication 800-53 covers procedural steps in
risk management that address security control selection for
federal information systems. On-going research efforts are un-
der way world-wide to improve cyber-security capabilities for
critical infrastructures. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion Technical Council (IEC-TC) 57, North American Elec-
tric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) drafting team, International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) are working individually to develop different
standards and regulation to enhance the cyber-physical security
of power industries [15], [16].
The major contribution of this survey paper includes an
extensive review of power control center risk assessment
frameworks which emphasize on the intrusion-based attacks to
substation-level and substation-connected networks with a full
spectrum of specific attack vectors that may disrupt operations,
directly or indirectly. The physical impacts, which are the
implications of cyber manipulations, can lead to widespread
system instability that requires combinatorial evaluation and
verifications of potential threats based on the plausible events
from the access points as well as assistance by the insiders.
The contingency planning applications, i.e., “what-if” attack
scenarios that remove components/substations from a power
grid, ensures system stability in term of both stead-state and
dynamical aspects in light of such attacks. This paper also
describes a justification of cyber-based contingency evaluation
with a thorough discussion of conceptual impact expansion of
the real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses,
and mitigation (RAIM) framework [17] depicted in Fig. 3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
envisions the challenges and perspectives of the current state
of the art. Section III describes intelligent attack scenarios
on substations and their potential system impacts. Section
IV introduces the I of RAIM which is a conceptualization
of impact evaluation using both steady-state and dynamics
analyses. Section V analyzes static and dynamical simulations
cases using the IEEE 118-bus system for substation vulnera-
bility assessment and system instability. Section VI provides
concluding remarks.
II. STATE OF THE ART: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTIVES
The power grid has now emerged into one of the largest,
most complex systems of human invention in all of history,
involving tremendous communication bandwidth for the in-
teractions between cyberinfrastructure and physical systems.
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Fig. 3: Conceptualization of Impact Evaluation, the ‘I’ of RAIM [17].
SCADA systems are an essential part of power communi-
cation infrastructures and play a central role in ensuring
effective operations of bulk power systems. SCADA systems
have helped to achieve new levels of system reliability and
meet improved power quality requirements. The use of IP-
based communication frameworks though, has brought about
concerns over cybersecurity issues. As a result, the opera-
tional reliability of a power grid requires new methodological
developments to align reliability goals with emerging risks
of new communications technologies. Currently there are no
comprehensive techniques and tools available to model and
evaluate the hypothetical impacts of cyberattacks. The abrupt
disruption or disconnections of nodes corresponding to load
and generation can result in detrimental effects to the power
grid. A US Government report published in 2007 reported
several incidents of cybersecurity penetration in control system
of different critical infrastructure [18].
A. Power Control Center Framework
Power infrastructure communication is integral to a na-
tion’s critical infrastructure [19]. As early as the 1980s, the
revolution of information communication technology (ICT)
for power grid operation started changing how critical in-
frastructures are managed [20]. As shown in Fig. 2, ICT
consists of generation local area network (LAN), transmission
LAN and wide area network (WAN), distribution LAN and
WAN, distributed generation LAN and WAN and Customer
LAN networks. Different LANs are connected through pub-
lic communication networks that are generally managed by
telecommunication companies. There are often three hierarchi-
cal control centers: (1) a national control center, (2) regional
control centers, and (3) local control centers. Each local
control center collects real-time data from physical systems
of substations and transmits that data to regional control
center after processing the data. Distribution Control Centers
manage local control centers for the largest substations in
the distribution system. The Ukraine cyberattack compromised
the distribution control center as highlighted with a red box
in Fig. 2. This would impact significantly the overall grid
operation in a global sense of potential cascading in case
of generation-load mismatch. Regional Control Centers are
associated with managing high-voltage transmission lines and
have supervisory control of all local control centers in that
particular region. Regional control centers act as middleman
between local control centers, distribution control centers
and national control centers. Regional control centers mainly
control transmission substations. National control centers play
a vital role in power system operation and controls. Such
centers control the extra high voltage (EHV) transmission
system, coordinate the activities of regional control centers,
and are responsible for overall power system reliability and
stability. National control centers collect real-time data from
regional control centers and perform the function of EMS,
state estimator and central network management of the overall
power system [21]. Studies by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) have shown that a simulated
cyberattack drill demonstrates an absolute possibility to bring
down the US power grids [22].
B. Past, Current, and Future Applications of Contingencies
The power grid is designed to withstand a single compo-
nent outage (N-1 contingency), ensuring that operating limits
are not violated by such outages [23], [24]. Power system
reliability evaluation includes the integration of individual
substation operating states and contingencies which are mea-
sured in terms of power frequency and duration of substation
equipment outage events. Failure criteria for substations and
violation thresholds of system reliability are defined based on
5substation size, location and functionality within the system
[25], [26]. Literature review shows that there have been a
number of blackouts caused by cascading failures of trans-
mission lines and generating units in recent years throughout
the world [27]. If a substation is de-energized, the change in
power flow is compensated by other substations, which must
have enough spare capacity to carry the excess power. If they
do not, transmission lines and transformers of those substations
will be overloaded and overcurrent protection will trip those
components to avoid thermal damage. This event will initiate a
cascading failure as the excess power is switched onto neigh-
boring circuits, which may also be running at or near their
maximum capacity [28]. A probabilistic model can be used to
estimate the cascading outages in high-voltage transmission
network [29] and online dynamic security assessment in an
EMS environment [30].
1) Single Contingency: Power system security is referred
to the contingency analysis where an N-select-1 list of com-
ponents is hypothesized as taken out of service to determine
whether any such state results in a violation of voltage or
power flow limits in a power grid [31]. In the 1970’s, the
traditional approach of steady-state contingency analysis is to
test all contingencies, such as transmission line outage and loss
of generation, that are predefined by system planner/operators
experience and intuition [32]. Inadequacies of this traditional
approach were later addressed and new techniques proposed
to perform exhaustive testing, including both primary and
secondary contingencies. Contingency screening for fast real-
time contingency analysis was proposed using modification
of fast decoupled power flow algorithm [33]. An efficient
contingency analysis method has been implemented to detect
of flow violation for transmission lines [34], [35].
2) Multiple Contingencies: To evaluate the contingency
severity of removing any combination of substations from the
system, an AC load flow method might be used [36], [37].
Multiple contingency is seen to have largely prepared reliable
systems to survive disasters [38], [39]. In North America,
FERC has clarified that the list of the contingencies to be used
in performing system operation and planning studies should
include all the contingencies, N-1, N-1-1, N-2, as well as
multiple contingencies [35]. As required by NERC reliability
standards, the power system after a contingency should return
to a secure, reliable state within 30 minutes [37].
Multiple contingencies have been researched since the late
1970s [32]. Since then, the main effort of such research is
to reduce the computation burden caused by the tremendous
number of contingency cases in bulk power system: the total
number of N-k contingency cases is N !/[k!(N − k)]. Various
screening and ranking techniques based on the theoretical
approach and parallel computing techniques based on the
simulation-based approach have been proposed and developed
in the past five decades.
Conventional approaches related to the screening and rank-
ing of contingencies are illustrated in [40]–[44]. After con-
tingency studies for transmission planning were regulated
by NERC in 2005 [37], research relevant to the NERC-
compliance study have accelerated and the techniques for
searching for critical/credible contingencies which consists
of N-2 contingencies and N-1-1 contingencies have been
developed in industry as well as academia [37], [45]. Most of
the approaches described by academia are based on network
topology analysis [45], [46] and nonlinear optimization heuris-
tics [45], [46] in terms of power planning perspectives. The
hurricane Katrina disaster motivated power system engineers
to consider the increasing risk of natural disasters and the
necessity of online multiple contingency studies. Because mul-
tiple contingencies could lead to cascading failures, multiple
contingencies have also been studied in terms of wide area
monitoring and protection with sensors such as PMUs in
the wake of wide-spread blackouts affecting North America
and Europe in 2003, 2004, and 2006. Since then, multiple
contingencies and consecutive large blackouts have been a
frequently discussed topic in industry. Information about past
blackouts have been shared by industries and academia all over
the world every two years during CIGRE Paris session since
2006 [47]–[51].
3) Cyber-Related Contingencies: As IP-based commu-
nications infrastructure is the trend for future deployments,
expecting only N-1 contingencies is no longer be meaningful
for both security analysts and power engineers [24]. As shown
in Fig. 3, a coordinated attack associated with compromised
substations enables attackers to trip multiple generators, trans-
mission lines, loads, or transformers nearly-simultaneously in
a power grid, impairing system operating conditions. A more
structured, integrated framework with high redundancy and
defense mechanisms is required to face the challenges of in-
telligent coordinated cyberattacks, which can severely impact
system operations [52]. Violation of predefined thresholds of
substation voltages, system frequency, and branch flows may
lead to cascading failure and a system blackout [53].
As system loading levels vary over time, the criticality of
each substation (node) can be different at different times [54].
An approach to hypothesize multiple substation outages is
proposed to presume that a set of combinations of IP-based
substations are compromised by intruders and are electroni-
cally manipulated to abruptly isolate substations from the grid
with disruptive switching actions [55], [56]. Combinatorial
substation outages are the cyber-contingency analysis that
enumerates the worst-case scenarios. Since the solution space
of the sum of S-select-k problem can be extremely large, a
systematic elimination approach using power flow modules is
used to validate each combination in order to capture the worst
combinations [55]–[58]. This process eliminates insignificant
combinations, enumerating from the first-level substation list
of the RPM. While this approach may not be exhaustively
enumerated; it can be further enhanced with prioritization of
substation selection criteria. This contingency analysis is based
on the relationship between substation critical cyber systems
that have direct interaction with the physical power grid, i.e.,
the cyber assets that would have control capability to discon-
nect local components from the grid. Based on the conclusion
of previous work [55], [56], manipulation of microprocessor-
based relays on bus differential protection would have a detri-
mental effect, able to disconnect large numbers of components
from the system. At minimum, hypothesized cyber attacks
would occur at multiple substations, as attackers would be
66KRUW7HUP
9ROWDJH6WDELOLW\
7UDQVLHQW6WDELOLW\
)UHTXHQF\6WDELOLW\
3RVVLEOH3K\VLFDO,PSDFWV6\VWHP'\QDPLFV
8QLQWHQWLRQDO,VODQGLQJ
5HJLRQDO2XWDJH
%ODFNRXW
3HUPDQHQW(TXLSPHQW)DLOXUH
6KXWGRZQRI*HQHUDWRUV
/RVVRI)UHTXHQF\&RQWURO
([FHVV'HILFLHQF\LQ 5HDFWLYH3RZHU6XSSRUW
'LVFRQQHFWLRQRI7UDQVPLVVLRQ/LQHV
'LVFRQQHFWLRQVRI7UDQVIRUPHUV
'LVFRQQHFWLRQ RI/RDGV
7ULJJHURI6\VWHP'\QDPLFV
&D
VF
DG
LQJ
(Y
HQ
WV
6ORZ'\QDPLFV
2YHUORDGV
&\EHU0DQLSXODWLRQ
5H
VX
OWLQ
J,
PS
OLF
DWL
RQ
V
$WWDFNHUV¶7DUJHWVRQ3RZHU*ULG&RQWURO6\VWHPV
*HQHUDWLRQ0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHPV
6XEVWDWLRQ$XWRPDWLRQ
&RQVXPHU/RDGV
7UDQVPLVVLRQ&RQWURO&HQWHU
'LVWULEXWHG(QHUJ\
5HVRXUFHV
'LVWULEXWLRQ'LVSDWFKLQJ&HQWHU
,QGXVWULDO/RDGV
Fig. 4: Cyberattack Implications.
able to intrude to the S number of IP-based substations. Under
this assumption, at least one or more substation outages would
occur, depending on the number of substations that have been
compromised [55], [56], [58].
Preliminary investigation on system reliability and its re-
sulting impacts has shown the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm with quantitative analysis on penetrated protective
IED relays [59]. Busbar differential relays might be of in-
terest to attackers launching coordinated cyberattacks, since
compromised busbars controls can disconnect more than one
component from a system simultaneously. Such controls can
be accessed by internal or external attackers in four different
ways: physical attack, compromised communication channels,
direct attacks on relays and changing the embedded program in
relays [60]. A small number of approaches exist to find critical
substation combinations or collapse sequence of cascading
failures, but none are in online environments, and all are
applicable only to restricted numbers of combinations of
substations [36]. Since the event of simultaneous cyberattacks
on 3 or more substations is rare, the worst case will be
considered. Priority list 2 only evaluates the impact by de-
energizing more than two substations that result in the impact
factor of 1.0 and serves as a message to control centers [4].
This is a graph traversal algorithm that navigates the vertices
of a graph first deep, then wide. This algorithm traverses from
a root node in depth until a visited vertex is found [61].
It is commonly used in substations. Internal busbar faults
are sensed by the busbar differential relay to trip all the
breakers simultaneously connected to the busbar [62]. Cyber-
based contingency analysis is a fundamentally new way to
assess the system stability by considering all plausible attack
vectors. These attack vectors can be any combination of these:
(i) distributed denial of service (DDoS) [63]–[65], (ii) alter and
hide (AaH) [66], (iii) data integrity [63], [67]–[71], (iv) load
altering [72], [73], or/and (v) disruptive switching [64].
C. Dynamics of Intelligent Cyberattack
As shown in Fig. 4, the existing major entities of bulk power
systems have been upgraded with IP-based communication in-
frastructure over the past decades. The figure in gray highlights
that are the generation and electrical loads. These intercon-
nected entities have a profound impact by cyber manipulation,
either locally, regionally, or globally. The manipulation using a
compromised local control system can impair system operation
due to the potential impacts on the physical system. The
triggers of system dynamics, such as disconnections or abrupt
shutdown of important elements within a power grid, can
implicate the possibilities of system stability.
One of the worst-case scenarios is a widespread cascading
failure that will lead to a power blackout costing tens or
hundreds of billions of the dollars to an economy as large
as that of the USA. The importance of considering power
system dynamics for cybersecurity issues has already been rec-
ognized. Power system dynamics can be significantly affected
by network communication and control system infrastructure
including generator controllers and protective relays. The
7establishment of a mathematical formulation for representing
power system dynamics is a non-trivial task. Controllers and
protections include non-linear behavior and discrete changes.
In addition, any formulation must account for many interac-
tions. There can be interaction between controllers and interac-
tion between protection equipment. There can be interactions
between controllers and protection, between controller and the
grid, and between protection and the grid. This sub-section
focuses on the review of the recent studies that are relevant to
power system dynamics.
The recent research studies can be categorized as focused
on either (1) Abnormal power system dynamic phenomena,
or (2) Measurement of implementing cyber-physical security
systems. Typically, an abnormal behavior of power system
dynamics is classified into four phenomena that can result in a
widespread power outage: voltage stability, frequency stability,
transient stability and overload. The latest research studies
cover the first three abnormal phenomena.
1) Transient Stability: Transient stability is examined using
the undesired control of the semi-conductor-based reactive
power compensators such as static var compensator (SVC)
and static synchronous compensator (STATCOM). References
[63], [67], [68] exhibit the possibility of being out-of-step due
to biased or delayed operation of SVC or STATCOM. The
fundamental idea is to represent the same dynamic behavior,
even when the improper control parameters are tuned. Modi-
fication attack is assumed to be responsible for the undesired
control. This vulnerability is relevant only when a system fault
occurs near the reactive power compensator.
2) Frequency Stability: Frequency stability is examined us-
ing undesired control of Automatic Generation Control (AGC)
or falsified load change data. Because falsified load changes
have the same effect as an undesired control signal of AGC, the
two attack scenarios can be treated as the same one. References
[69], [70] exhibit the possibility of frequency collapse which
results in significant frequency change, such as 3 Hz or
more. The fundamental idea is to represent the same dynamic
behavior when the wrong/improper control parameters of AGC
are tuned. Data integrity attacks are assumed for the undesired
control and the falsified load changes. The sudden loss of
generation/loads can also cause frequency instability [64],
[65]. In this study, mono-directional frequency drop occurs
because under-frequency relays are not considered, although
the electric supply is less than the demand after the breaker
trip. The fundamental idea is to create two or more isolated
systems that cause a large mismatch of the power balance. A
DDoS attack is assumed for the breaker trip.
3) Short-Term Voltage Stability: Short-term voltage stabil-
ity is examined using the undesired control of stepwise change
in active or reactive power outputs. Reference [71] exhibits
the possibility of short-term voltage collapse which is caused
by a significant voltage drop. The fundamental idea is to
change active or reactive power output in order to generate
a growing power swing oscillation and/or to have a shortage
of reactive power support in the whole grid. In this study,
transient stability problems seem to occur when a voltage
collapse occurs. In the case of large networks, the short-term
voltage collapse in entire power system could lead to an out-
of-step condition in the entire network. Short-term voltage
response is also examined using the non-operation of primary
relay or unwanted operation of the back-up relay. Reference
[71] exhibits the possibility of large voltage excursion. The
fundamental idea is to enlarge the impact of the fault via non-
operation of the primary protection or the unwanted operation
of the back-up protection. However, the goal of this study
does not represent blackouts, but to establish a complex cyber-
physical system. Similar study includes using the undesired
control of SVC caused by man-in-the-middle attack [74].
4) Slow Dynamics: Long-term dynamics is considered us-
ing the arbitrary load change by jamming the pricing signal
in the electricity market. References [72], [73] studies the
possibilities of unwanted slow dynamics caused by the delayed
and distorted data-centric attack, which eventually causes the
degradation of the controller performance and the negative
impact on any kind of the power system stability. Smart
meters in electrical distribution network which utilize wireless
communication such as WiMAX is assumed to be used for this
scenario and the jamming attack is applied to the electricity
market in order to jam the power price signaling over a
large area such as the load center. Such manipulation of the
electricity market via the data-centric attack (or the false data
injection attack) can bring the attacker to the profit and cause
the significant impact on the stability of the power system.
D. Implementation of Cyber-Physical Security System
In order to implement a cyber-physical system including
power system dynamics, two streams can be classified: (1)
Simulation-based approach, and (2) simulator-based approach.
The first approach is often used for large network studies,
while the second approach is often used for small network
studies because of the space limitation of the test bed or
the test facilities. Therefore, such simulators are suitable
for representing frequency stability studies because the large
network representation is not necessary. The transient stability
study is not examined using any simulators or any test beds.
In order to evaluate the performance of the test bed, small
signal stability or steady-state stability, instead of abnormal
power dynamics phenomena, is selected in [72]. The second
approach can represent a relatively large network such as
IEEE 39 bus and IEEE 118 bus systems. On the other hand,
a mathematical approach of establishing a hybrid system is
proposed and its performance validated using a simple network
without assuming the specific cyberattack [75], [76].
III. INTELLIGENT ATTACK SCENARIOS ON SUBSTATIONS
AND SYSTEM IMPACTS
A distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) harnesses the
power of agents to disrupt communication infrastructure that
can interrupt the availability of services in substation net-
works. Possible consequences include preventing information
exchange among relays and programmable controllers. As a
result, information processors and IEDs are not aware of the
current status and fault condition of the system. As this blocks
alarm and trip signals, a DDoS attack on transformer and line
protection schemes of an IED does disable the functions of
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This is similar to a situation where a malfunctioning relays
might not perform the operation as they should, based on the
original settings of substation logic controllers.
Upon a successful intrusion to a substation network, attack-
ers can plot for traffic manipulation using their domain-specific
knowledge. The required cyber-physical security understand-
ing between the standardized communication protocols and the
connection with the physical devices is crucial to maximize
the impact of attack. The attacker would have to understand
software setup, and understand how device addresses map
to a user interface in power control centers. The obvious
manipulation is to add delay for each signal that affects not
only the protection scheme but also SCADA functionalities
at the control center. Blocking a trip signal for certain time
will delay the breaker-trip in a faulted section of transmission
line and can have an adverse effect on system operation. This
section enumerates credible intelligent attack strategies upon
their success intruding to a substation network.
A. Scenario 1: Transformer Overloading
Transformers are the critical components of power sub-
stations, and play a crucial role in transferring power from
electrical generators to loads through other geographically
dispersed substations. Failed high-voltage transformers can
require very long times to replace. A number of protection
schemes are used to protect a transformer from various fault
conditions. Transformer life is limited because of aging of
insulation. According to IEEE Std C57.91-1981, the expected
life of power transformer is 180,000 hours or approximately 21
years. IEDs are programmed to calculate the time left before
a possible trip due to loss of insulation life [77]. Several
hypothesized scenarios present how a potential cyberattack
can cause damage to substation equipment. Studies show that
there are several ways to get into a substation communication
network. In this section we consider the hypothesis that an
attacker has the total control of substation communication
network and have access to IEDs which are the source of
substation and IED configuration descriptions. After having
access to SCD and CID files, an intruder can plan for a
devastating attack on substation operations. SCD and CID files
are the source of substation topology, protection schemes, back
up protection schemes and crucial settings for different IEDs.
Fig. 5 shows a typical substation configuration where
Transformer-1 (Xfmr-1) and Transformer-2 (Xfmr-2) are in
parallel operation and sharing the total load of 20 MVA. This
is a common practice of using at minimum two transformers
to share a load. Each Transformer rated power is 12.5 MVA.
In the diagram, the illustrated transformer current load factor
is 80 percent. Two incoming feeders and four outgoing feeders
are connected in BUS-1 and BUS-2 respectively. Fig. 5
shows that Xfmr-1 and Xfmr-2 are protected by differential
protection, thermal protection and over-current protection. A
simple substation communication network is depicted, using
an information processor, a gateway, a modem, server, a
remote I/O unit and a phasor data concentrator. Fig. 6 depicts
the ethernet gateway, modem, and wireless link which are the
access points used by a cyber attacker to breach the substation
communication network. Once the attacker gains access to
the communication network, (s)he can access substation SCD
and CID files. To execute transformer overloading protection
failure, the attacker need to modify the overcurrent and thermal
protection schemes. It is assumed that intruder will reset the
threshold values of different relay trip settings to much higher
values so that the relay will not act to trip a breaker during
a typical fault condition. For example, if the normal breaker
trip setting for overcurrent protection is 150% overloading and
an attacker increases this value to 300% then the breaker will
not trip for less than 300% overloading. Similarly, thermal
protection will not work if the breaker trip setting is changed
to a much higher value. DDoS attack or traffic manipulation
can block all kinds of alarm and trip signals from bay level
to station level. As a result, local and regional control centers
will not be able to receive any real-time information, such
as transformer trips, alarms, equipment status, other system
status, from process and bay levels.
Once trip settings of overcurrent and thermal protection
relays have been modified and the alarm signals from relays
and other IEDs have been blocked, the attacker is ready to
overload one of the transformers. As shown in Fig. 7, the
attacker can open circuit breaker-3 (CB-3) or circuit breaker-4
(CB-4) or both to shutdown Xfmr-2. Since all other breakers
except circuit breaker-3 and circuit breaker-4 are in a closed
position, there is no power interruption in that substation. As
a result, the Xfmr-1 will carry the total load of 20 MVA and
hence it will be overloaded by 160%. In this overload condi-
tion, the transformers temperature will increase rapidly. This
will adversely impact transformer insulation and transformer
life [78].
Studies on transformer show that most of the transformer
failure is directly related to insulation deterioration with time.
IEEE standard states that reduction of transformer insulation
is a function of time and temperature [79]. Power loss (I2R)
of the winding and the stray loss in the tank, core and other
metallic structures are the main source of transformer heat
generation. Mechanical strength of transformer insulation de-
teriorates with time and becomes brittle when it is exposed to
higher temperature [78]. According to IEEE Standard C57.91-
1995 the overall life of a transformer is equal to life of
insulation. the normal life expectancy of a power transformer
is 20.55 years when it is assumed that transformer operates at
constant 30 ○C average ambient temperature and the hottest-
spot winding temperature will not exceed 110 ○C [79], [80].
Since the temperature rise of transformer is not uniform, the
hottest-spot temperature is considered to find out the insulation
aging factor (FAA) [78]. IEC standard states that relative
aging rate is doubled for every 6 ○C increment of windings
hottest-spot [79], [80]. IEEE Guide for Loading Mineral-
Oil-Immersed Transformers summarizes the following risks
of transformer overloading and its implications of potential
equipment damage [79].
1) The evolution of free gas from insulation of winding and
other metallic, structural parts of transformers reduce
dielectric strength.
2) Operating at high temperature will reduce the mechani-
cal strength of both conductors and structural insulation.
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Fig. 6: Case 2: An Attacker Gained Administrative Privilege to Local SCADA Network.
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Fig. 7: Case 3: Attack Execution to Overload a Power Transformer.
This reduction of strength can cause permanent damage
to transformers if the mechanical forces during tran-
sient overcurrent faults exceed the reduced mechanical
strength.
3) Thermal expansion of conductors, insulation and other
metallic parts can permanently deform transformer bod-
ies.
4) Rapid thermal expansion of transformer oil will increase
the pressure inside the transformer and result in oil
leaking and insulation failure.
5) Current transformers installed in bushing and reactors
are also at risk due to higher temperature.
6) Increased resistance of tap changer contacts can create
a localized high temperature region which could result
arcing and gas evolution.
Two types of emergency overloading are described in IEEE
standards:
1) Long-Term Emergency Overloading: This kind of emer-
gency condition arises when system components are out
of service for an extended period. IEEE Standard trans-
formers tolerate long-term, steady state overloads with
some loss of transformer expectancy. In [79], acceptable
long term overloading is defined as a temperature rise of
hottest-spot windings limited to 120 ○C to 140 ○C, where
the top oil temperature does not exceed 110 ○C any time.
This type of overloading may occur two or three times
over the normal life of a standard transformer and each
incident can last several months [79].
2) Short-Term Emergency Overloading: This emergency
condition sees a standard transformer carry a maximum
200% overload for a short period, limited to a maxi-
mum of 30 minutes. In such conditions, the standard
allows a transformers hottest-spot winding temperature
to reach no more than 180 ○C, and requires that the
peak oil temperature not exceed 110 ○C any time. The
risk of short term overloading is more severe than long
term overloading. Only one or two occurrence of such
overloading are recommended over a normal life of a
standard transformer [79].
In the hypothetical attack scenario, the load of Xfmr-1 is
doubled instantly and the transformers temperature will in-
crease rapidly. If Xfmr-1 is an IEEE-compliant transformer, a
160% overloaded condition will cause the transformers hottest
spot temperature to reach up to 160 ○C [80] where transformer
insulation aging acceleration rate (FAA) is expressed by
FAA = exp (15000383 − 15000θ+273).
Fig. 8 shows that FAA changes exponentially with respect
to temperature. It can be noted from Fig. 8 that the value
of insulation aging acceleration is 1 and 92.1 at 110 ○C and
160 ○C respectively. It shows that FAA at 160
○C is 92.1 times
faster than at 110 ○C. IEEE Standard C57.91-1995 gives the
percent loss of transformer insulation life due to continuous
operation above rated hottest-spot temperature [79]. It is noted
in IEEE standard that a transformer will lose 1% and 4% of
its normal life due to continuous overloading for 1.96 hours
and 7.8 hours respectively at 160 ○C hottest-spot temperature.
If this situation continues transformer insulation might fail in
less than 48 hours. Under extreme circumstance, a transformer
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can plausibly be overloaded by more than 200% when three
transformers are in parallel operation in this kind of attack.
The hottest-spot temperature may rise more than 200 ○C in this
type of attack on a 3-way parallel transformer [80]. According
to IEEE standards FAA is approximately 1723 at 200
○C
hottest-spot temperatures. This situation results 4% loss of
transformer life for every 25 minutes continuous operation.
Such a transformer might be destroyed in less than 10 hours
if this overloading condition continues.
In this hypothesized attack scenario, some other issues need
to be considered for insulation aging:
1) During overloading, gas may form inside transformer
tank and affect the integrity of insulation.
2) The hottest spot temperature may vary from manufac-
turer to manufacturer and the rating of transformer.
3) Tap changer operation during overloading may cause
additional damages.
4) Cooling fan failure of the transformer radiator expedites
the temperature rise.
5) It is very unlikely that the overloaded transformer in
such an attack is brand new. Thus, it may take less time
to destroy the insulation rather is calculated above.
6) An ambient temperature of more than 30 ○C will in-
crease the rate of insulation aging.
B. Scenario 2: Disrupting Switching Executions for Circuit
Breakers and Isolators
In this hypothesized scenario, an attacker focusses on dam-
age to circuit breakers or isolators to interrupt the normal
operation of a substation. As depicted in Fig. 9, switching
sequential attacks can result in power substation outages. A
switching attack upon compromised multiple substations can
initiate system instability that can trigger widespread outage
in a power interconnection. The assumptions for this scenario
are as follows:
1) Unmanned, remote substations have no video surveil-
lance and minimal physical security. Isolators are not
interlocked with circuit breakers, and can be operated
from compromised computers.
2) An attacker is capable of operating circuit breakers and
isolators using configuration information available in the
relays and user interface of local control panel.
3) All digital signals reporting circuit breaker and isolator
operation are blocked. As a result, the regional control
center will not receive any authentic real-time informa-
tion regarding their use.
Fig. 10 shows that one incoming feeder and three outgoing
feeders are connected to a busbar, and a total seven isolators
and four circuit breakers are connected to protect the feeders.
The hypothesis is that a cyber intruder has access the commu-
nication network of the substation to commence continuous
switching actions to take one or more pieces of equipment
out of service. Although circuit breakers and isolators are
disconnecting switches, a circuit breaker is designed to operate
while lines are energized, whereas an isolator is designed for
use while de-energized. The following are the main causes of
circuit breaker failure due to disruptive switching:
1) Mechanical failure of spring charged motor
2) Insulation failure
3) Loss of arc interrupting medium, e.g., SF6 gas, air
pressure, or oil pressure
Dielectric break down of the air gap between contacts causes
arcing during opening and closing of circuit breakers and
isolators. Arcing and thermal ionization results in high temper-
ature on contact surfaces, causing contact welded and erosion.
Arcing may persist for 46.5 seconds, which might increase
contact resistance by several multiples [81]. Isolators are more
vulnerable to arching than circuit breaker, because isolators
have no arc-extinguishing medium. The erosion of contact
materials depends on opening and closing times, which depend
in turn on motor charged spring operation [81]. Increased
resistance of eroded contacts causes heat during conduction.
It is recommended that the temperature of contact surface not
exceed 110 ○C for copper and aluminum conductors [82].
Study shows that mechanical inadequacy of contact break-
ing is the cause of 75% of circuit breaker and isolator failures.
The failure of this critical equipment increases with the voltage
level and number of operations [83]. The failure of isolators
is associated with the following reasons:
1) Arcing contact failure
2) Main contact failure
3) Alignment failure
4) Motor failure
The most common mechanical endurance failure is spring
charging motor failure. A motor limit switch is responsible
for motor relay energization to store potential energy in
springs which are prone to fail with excessive circuit breaker
operation. The failure of charging springs is expressed as
circuit breaker failure. In case of isolators, eroded contact
surfaces results in unacceptable heat during conduction, which
deforms the contact surfaces.
C. Scenario 3: Entire Substation Outage
This hypothesized scenario represents entire an substation
out-age and associated contingencies. A substation can be
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Fig. 9: Switching Attacks Upon Compromised Substation Networks.
treated as a super node of a power system electrical net-
work where multiple incoming and outgoing transmission
lines/feeders are connected. De-energization of a critical sub-
station may lead to a catastrophic cascading failure of entire
system. In this study, the term “substation outage” refers to
the complete electrical disconnection of a substation from the
power grid, including de-energization of busbars, transformers
and transmission lines. A substation outage causes topological
changes to a power grid network as a number of transmission
lines/feeders and busbars are isolated from the system.
Fig. 11 shows a typical distribution substation topology
where an incoming feeder and three outgoing feeders are
serving the loads. Outgoing feeder-1, 2, 3 and the incoming
feeder are protected from any internal and external faults by
circuit breaker-1, 2, 3 and 6 respectively. A successful intru-
sion into relays and local user interfaces enables an attacker to
operate any of the circuit breakers in the substation. Substation
outage can be caused in a number of ways, depending on
busbar and breaker arrangements. The outage attack illustrated
in Fig. 11 opens either all circuit breakers simultaneously,
or circuit breaker-6 only. Since there is a single incoming
feeder, opening breaker-6 ensures an entire substation outage
while circuit breakers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 remain closed. In both
case all busbars and transformers will be de-energized. The
green lines in Fig. 11 represent the de-energized region of the
substation. Knowing substation topological configuration prior
to executing a cyberattack will assist an intruder in isolating
the substation from the power system. Such an attack on a
transmission substation is more critical than on a distribution
substation since the former carries a larger amount of power
and is generally responsible to maintain connectivity with
multiple other substations in the grid.
Power system reliability evaluation includes the integration
of individual substation operating states and contingencies,
which are measured in terms of power frequency and the
duration of substation equipment outage events. Failure criteria
for substations and violation thresholds of system reliability
are defined based on substation size, location and functionality
within the system [25], [26]. A literature review shows that
there have been a number of blackouts caused by cascad-
ing failures of transmission lines and generating units in
recent years throughout the world [27]. If a substation is
de-energized, power flows through other substations, which
must have enough spare capacity to carry the excess power.
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If they do not, transmission lines and transformers of those
substations will be overloaded and overcurrent protection will
trip those components to avoid thermal damage. This event
will initiate a cascading failure as the excess power is switched
onto neighboring circuits, which may also be running at or
near their maximum capacity [28].
When a substation fails due to cyberattack, power flows shift
to adjacent lines. This kind of event may overload the adjacent
transmission lines and eventually the overloaded lines will be
tripped to avoid transmission line damage. Redistribution of
power flows through a transmission network may overload
multiple lines. The number of overloaded transmission lines
will be increased if this situation continues, eventually result-
ing in a cascading outage [28].
IV. IMPACT EVALUATION
A hypothesized impact study evaluates the plausible con-
sequence of cyberattacks and anticipates system behaviors
based on a certain operating condition. Such prediction of
potential cascading outages and failures can be utilized to
derive metrics that quantify the attributes of a case study.
This requires a validation of impact credibility with respect
to methods used in steady-state and dynamic simulations. As
shown in Fig. 3, a conceptualization of impact evaluation is
proposed to handle the combinatorial nature of a cyber-related
issues associated with (1) critical/non-critical combination
verifications, (2) cascade confirmation, and (3) re-evaluation.
A. Critical/Non-Critical Combination Verifications
As depicted in Fig. 3, this verification involves steady-
state and dynamic analysis of the hypothesized components
and substation outages. This check point is used to deter-
mine inconsistent simulation outcomes from both dynamic
and static modules, and to reconcile the difference through
cascade confirmation and probability re-evaluation through
an adjustment of parameters. For example, a hypothesized
substation outage would result in power flow diverged that
may not necessarily reflect the similar outcome in the dynamic
simulation. This could happen where a power flow simulator
shows no symptom of cascading failure but dynamic study
indicates otherwise.
B. Cascade Confirmation
The cascade confirmation pro-posed here is to determine
the coherency of relative angle and frequency under certain
switching permutation. The studies will include determination
of the number of permutations that is deemed conclusive and
adequate corresponding to sequential contingencies. The effec-
tive pre-screening of sequential contin-gencies would include
substation dependencies and the practicality of concurrent
cyberattack to abruptly disconnect components/substations out
of the grid. The challenges here adequately represents an
unordered combination of outage from the steady-state power
flow module.
C. Re-Evaluation
Re-evaluation often occurs when both simulators demon-
strate significant deviation of outcome that requires an adjust-
ment. Such errors can be related to either of the simulators
where specific handling is necessary. The discovery of tuning
between the two modules can significantly reduce of the dis-
crepancies and will strengthen the verification and credibility
of the hypothesized scenarios. The results depend on the size
of a power system. Fig. 12 enumerates all critical and non-
critical cases and illustrates cascaded evaluation with steady-
state rapid screening to dynamic simulation to verify the catas-
trophic scenarios. The divergence evaluation in a power flow
model determines the criticality of hypothesized substation
outages. However, the results of steady-state evaluation may
not consistently demonstrate the same outcome in the sense
of potential grid instability of cascading implication.
Fig. 12 describes the dependencies of steady-state simula-
tion screening with a probability of the critical contingency
P that is derived as 0.1%, while the probability of the non-
critical contingency is derived as 99.9%. The summation of
probabilities at each level (steady state and dynamics) is
always equal to 1.0. These probabilities are the statistical
numbers that will be established to determine the total number
of convergent and divergent cases. The steady-state approach
would largely eliminate the criticality of problematic scenarios
which may not be always true. The latter part of dynamic
simulation is to examine the consistencies of both methods
whether they are stable or unstable from the power system
stability point of view. This may not always be the same
between the both. The verification of dynamic simulation
could reveal the criticality of non-critical contingency which
is statistically derived. As shown in the figure, the critical
combinations with probability 0.1% based on steady-state
simulation will be examined with dynamic simulation that may
result in 73.5%. On the other hand, the dynamic simulation
verification can also reveal that the probability of the critical
contingency that is statistically derived by 4.7% from the
steady-state probability of the non-critical contingency, which
is 99.9% in most cases. Computationally, the steady-state
approach is much less expensive than the dynamic simulation
verification while the latter approach has a higher degree of
accuracy with detailed description of system behaviors.
In general, steady-state analysis may not always reflect
a potential issue of potential cascading, especially the
transient states are not sequentially captured one after another
subsequent outages. The stability evaluation of cascading
outages is a dynamic-security analysis with variables in
transient status such as time period, frequency and voltages
instability, generation-load imbalance, and metrics of cost-
benefit justification of catastrophic impacts [84]–[87]. For
example, the mismatch of generation and load in power
flow evaluation model can be numerically balanced on the
“reference” node, where physically, there is no slack bus in
the practical world. The imbalance of generation and load
can only be achieved by adjusting generation output and/or
shedding load. The time transition of one state to another is
not sequentially captured in the steady-state power flow model
– the power flow evaluation solely addresses the divergence-
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Fig. 12: Enumerative Grouping for Critical and Non-Critical Cases.
convergence issue which is directly related to the initiation
of voltage, generation, bus type, and topology of power
system. The time interval is critical in the dynamic analysis
with cascading outages. Sequential cascading events can be
induced in a bulk power system after an initial cyberattack
that can range in an interval of 5s to 15s for a switching
action initiated by attacker automation tools. The operation
condition of power system should reflect the transition states
that may lead to instable or not in term of generator ramping
up/down or load shedding as well as the influence of various
protection scheme deployed on any microprocessor-based
components within a substation-level network. Consequently,
the active power flow of each transmission line needs to be
updated during each time interval. Moreover, under certain
circumstance, the models of steady-state analysis may be
inadequate to detail the sequential disruptive switching
permutation under a substation specific scheme, e.g., one-
an-half bus-breaker model because the IEEE test case may
be simplified in most of the steady-state analysis appeared
in the literature. The accuracy of dynamics simulation may
necessarily needs a more detailed topology for such study.
Additionally, the steady-state analysis may not be able to
capture islanding issue when a cascading outage occurs [88],
[89]. In a larger system, the initiating event of switching
attacks upon the substations may initiate a breaker tripping
that results in multiple islands. This can be a unique situation
where power flow verification may not always agree with
a diverged outcome if multiple islands are discovered and
the handling of multiple “slack” buses may not immediately
compensate the generation-load imbalance across the islands.
Without a methodological approach, there may not be a direct
way to conclude that stabilities can be achieved among these
multiple islands as a result of a cyberattack initially.
V. IMPACT SIMULATION OF SWITCHING ATTACKS
The previous section of intelligent attack scenarios on
substations is representative of cyberattack impacts of (1)
transformer overloading, (2) disruptive switching action of
circuit breakers and isolators, and (3) entire substation outages,
by attackers who have successfully penetrated into substation
control networks. The first two cyberattack scenarios can
be visible to dispatchers at control centers before damage
has occurred, but only if those personnel are still able to
receive alarms from substation equipment while the attack is in
progress. These attacks have the long-term impacts to system
operation.
We make the assumptions here for impact simulations where
(1) there may be more than a single attacker successfully pen-
etrating substation networks, (2) there may be more than one
substation network compromised, (3) compromised substation
networks may be coordinated among attackers to optimally
maximize their attack strategies, for example causing signifi-
cant impacts from initiating events that can aggravate operating
conditions to cascading failure. (4) Attackers have access only
to real-time information based on substation networks they
compromised they do not have complete information.
This simulation section is divided into two: (1) steady-
state enumeration, (2) dynamic verification. Both simulation
approaches have been studied using the IEEE 118-bus system.
A. Steady-State Impact Enumeration
A steady-state enumeration is an unordered combination
of studies by hypothesizing components/substations outages.
Such outages do not consider the sequence of switching
actions because steady-state enumeration is a pre-screening
approach to determine if a certain number of substation
outages can lead to divergence of power flow solutions. This is
an indication of system collapse that would require a detailed
investigation under certain operating conditions of a power
grid. Recent studies have shown that certain pivotal substations
across an interconnection would have an extreme impact on
grid operations, very likely leading to a system-wide cascading
blackout. This is one combination of potential problems out
of many combinations. The challenge here is computational
method to systematically eliminate the worst case scenarios,
as a result of reducing the number of IP-based substations
plausibility for the purpose of operational planning.
The steady-state enumeration is an unordered combination
of study by hypothesizing the components/substations outage.
Such outage does not consider the sequence of switching
actions because this is a pre-screening approach to determine
if a certain number of substations outage can lead to the
divergence of power flow solutions. This is an indication of
system collapse that would require a detailed investigation
under certain operating condition of a power grid. The recent
studies have shown that certain pivotal substations across
an interconnection would have an extreme impact of the
grid operation that is very likely leading to a system-wide
cascading blackout [14], [90]. This is one of the combinations
of potential problems out of many other combinations. The
challenge here is computational method to systematically
eliminate the worst case scenarios, as a result of reducing the
number of IP-based substations plausibility for the purpose of
operational planning.
B. Dynamic Impact Verification
This section provides an intuition of dynamic impact ver-
ification from stead-state impact enumerations. While the
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reverse pyramid model (RPM) [55], [56], [58] significantly
reduces the number of combinations to consider, substation
outage combinations may not be considered critical without
dynamic simulation as to the impact of such outages. Part
of the reason is that steady-state analysis is based only on
power-flow convergence solutions, which may not suggest
that a combination of outages can lead to system instability.
Another reason dynamic simulation is important is that the
steady-state approach does not also provide an evaluation of
sequential switching events, and so models any cyberattack
on particular substations as one simultaneous switching action
for all switches. As discussed in Fig. 5, enumerations can be
contradictory, because steady-state simulation screening can
be critical where dynamic simulation verification would say
otherwise, or vice versa. They both serve as independent evalu-
ators to ensure the consistency of potential cyberattack impact
estimates. For example, some combinations can be critical-
AND-critical or non-critical-AND-non-critical for steady-state
and dynamic analyses, respectively.
Specifically, two possible discrepancies may exist: 1) The
power flow converges with a solution but some permutations
of dynamic analysis exhibits growing oscillation which lead
to no power flow solution in the end of dynamic study, 2) The
power flow diverges without a solution but dynamic simulation
verification can obtain a post-disturbance operating point. The
former example is illustrated in this Section using IEEE 118
bus system shown in Fig. 13. The elements of this system are
with 19 generators, 35 synchronous condensers, 177 lines, 9
transformers, and 91 loads.
1) Case 1 Hypothesized Cyberattack Resulting Dynamical
System Instability: The steady-state impact enumeration has
been studied and a single combination, which was deemed
non-critical (substations 13, 14, 17, 21, 34), has been selected
for dynamic impact verification. This is illustrated in Fig.
13, which shows the outage of multiple substations as well
as the associated transmission circuits connecting with other
substations that have been electrically disconnected. 14 line
circuits have been disconnected from the system: lines 17113,
3443, 3437, 1934, 1731, 2122, 2021, 1718, 1617, 1517, 1415,
1214, 1315, and 11-13. Upon execution of the switching action
illustrated in purple, the system becomes unstable, and so
1113 did not open. Under this study, the aforementioned attack
switching sequence is executed with an interval of 5 seconds
between switching actions. This is under the assumption that
attack agents coordinate among the compromised substations.
This sequence is an ordered enumeration out of the 14! =
8.718× 1010 ordered combinations. Future research is needed
to determine the critical switching action(s) that are dominant
to all ordered combinations.
Under this permutation, a power flow solution is obtained
where outages of substations 13, 14, 17, 21, and 34 are hypoth-
esized. However, this snapshot of study indicates that there is
a significantly low voltage in substation 33, which may require
corrective voltage control action within a permissible voltage
range, typically between 0.94 p.u. and 1.06 p.u. In short, this
type of simulation results may show power flow solutions, but
with more than one voltage violation or overloaded circuit.
Fig. 14 shows the dynamic response of the rotor angle
generators with relative to the center of inertia (COI). All
generators are assumed to be equipped with Automatic Voltage
Regulator (AVR) and a Turbine-Governor Controller, while all
synchronous compensators are assumed to be equipped with
the AVR only. Because no generic control parameters are given
in the test system, example control parameters of a DC exciter
and the thermal turbine governor are used in this study. The
inertia of those rotating machines are assumed to be 5 seconds
each.
It can be clearly observed from Fig. 14 that certain con-
tingencies, such as the removal of line 21-22 at the 25th
second, the removal of line 15-17 at the 45-th second, and the
removal of line 13-15 at the 60-th second leads to oscillation.
All rotor angles of generators show positive damping before
55 seconds under the same the figure. On the other hand,
most of the rotor angles of generators increase as growing
oscillation occurs after the 13th contingency at 60 seconds.
Consequently, the entire system collapses at 63-th second
due to this transient instability issue. The last switching
action to disconnect line 11-13 was not executed because the
system is already extremely vulnerable to collapse. It can also
be observed that after the of the synchronous compensator
connecting substation 15, 18, and 19 have negative values of
relative angles to same COI as shown in Table 3 and therefore,
the angle difference between the rotors angle of generators
shown in Table 4 and that in Table 3 exceeded 360 degrees
at 63 seconds. Therefore, although the power flow solution
can be obtained, the system cannot secure the power system
stability.
Fig. 15 shows bus voltages. As shown in this figure, the
load bus voltage at Bus 33 dramatically decreases after the
13th contingency at 60 seconds. This reveals that the electrical
center of the network is located near Bus 33. It can be
recognized from Fig 15 that the steady-state analysis based
approach cannot take into account dynamic behavior such
as power swing oscillation. This means that the steady-state
analysis based approach could give optimistic solutions. That
means that further research as to how to efficiently search for
“non-critical but close-to critical” contingency cases will be
important.
2) Case 2 – Hypothesized Cyberattack Resulting in Island-
ing: This case is the opposite of the case 1 in that there is no
critical-case power flow solution, but the dynamic simulation
demonstrates a non-critical case. Fig. 16 shows substation 100
that is hypothetically under cyberattack. The unique part of this
scenario is that Substation 100 is a pivotal node of the physical
system. This means the substation outage would result in two
isolated subsystems (Subsystems A and B). The following is
the sequential order of attack switching actions:
1) line 100–106 at 0-th second
2) line 100–104 at 5-th second
3) line 100–103 at 10-th second (two islands are formed)
4) line 100–101 at 15-th second
5) line 99–100 at 20-th second
6) line 98–100 at 25-th second
7) line 94–100 at 30-th second
8) line 92–100 at 35-th second
Fig. 17 consists of two subplots. The above plot is the
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Fig. 13: IEEE 118-bus system with Focus of Substations 13, 14, 17, 21, 34 Under Cyberattack.
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Fig. 16: IEEE 118-Bus System with Focus of Substation 100 Under Cyberattack (Form 2 Islands).
frequency in subsystem A, which indicates the system is
stable. The plot below is the active power plot for the critical
generators in subsystem A that shows stabilizing patterns to
the new operating points. Subsystem B, however, is unstable
in term of frequency prospective as depicted in Fig. 18.
This dynamic simulation does not consider system protection
implications. Underfrequency protection would typically shed
the loads in subsystem B that may stabilize the subsystem.
On the other hand, the underfrequency protection can also
electrically disconnect the only generator in subsystem B,
leading the subsystem to complete blackout. The outcome here
all depends on the rate of change of frequency. Dynamic sim-
ulation may not always result in similar observations to stead-
state analysis, because the stead-state analysis only includes
power flow solutions when there are no other control variables
that can be observed on those time-domain simulation patterns.
This does not include frequency information in the steady-
state analysis. The system frequency in steady-state analysis
is always assumed to be a nominal value, such as 60 or 50
Hertz.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The cybersecurity of a power grid is a topic of research that
enables asset owners to anticipate cascading failure as well
as identify interdependencies due to cyber-related initiating
events. This paper summarizes attack vectors with potential
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Fig. 17: Subsystem A Responses Both in System Frequency and
Active Power for Those Generators.
mid-term and long-term effects on the grid. We are in an era
where intelligent cyberattackers are emerging with the cross-
domain knowledge to execute attack plan against power grids.
In such attacks, attackers may not have enough or complete
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information about the grid to assure the success of their attack
plan. Defenders can reduce risks to power infrastructure with
improved security analytics in order to anticipate attacks with
serious consequences, and thus strategically deploy additional
security protections to critical substations and components.
This survey reviews research addressing how determine risk
metrics via steady-state and dynamics approaches using exist-
ing power system simulators.
Improving the cyber-situation awareness of the control
centers throughout an interconnection can be challenging.
Emerging, renewable energy sources increase the uncertainty
of entire power networks, as well as local networks. This
uncertainty increases the possibility of unexpected incidents
in future networks. System operators will have great difficulty
distinguishing cyberattack incidents from “normal” fluctua-
tions related to intermittent renewable generation. Because
stability margin could be diminished in future power systems,
more than two abnormal power system dynamic phenomena
could occur at the same time in the future. The latest research
studies have focused on only one abnormal phenomenon.
However, the consideration of a number of abnormal phe-
nomena caused by cyberattacks could be strongly required in
the future grid. Future work should include implementation of
derived metrics on combinations of hypothesized outages to be
verified by steady-state and dynamic system simulations. The
reduction of permutations and combinations of the hypothe-
sized scenarios can be explored to determine its practicality
and systemic bottleneck assessment in order to identify the
pivotal components/substations of a power grid.
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